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Betting on the Big: State-Brokered Land
Transfers, Large-Scale Agricultural
Producers, and Rural Policy
Implementation
Weigang Gong and Qian Forrest Zhang*
A B S T R A C T
As rural governments have become hollowed out and detached from rural society, can they
still effectively implement policies that lack popular support? This article examines a county in
Hunan Province, where local governments had strong incentives to implement a national pol-
icy of increasing double cropping in rice farming. Small farmers rejected double cropping as
unproﬁtable. Local governments’ limited capacity prevented them from either reshaping small
farmers’ economic calculus or coercing compliance. They strategically selected a policy tool ac-
ceptable tomost small farmers (paid land transfers) and gave new private large-scale producers
incentives to double crop by providing subsidies and access to large tracts of farmland. The
local governments now rely on large-scale producers as their agents for policy implementation
and agricultural governance. This and the collusive relationship that has formed between the
two are pushing small farmers out of agriculture.
Aligning local governments’motivations with the national government’s pol-icy goals is the ﬁrst step in effective policy implementation. Many studies
of local governments and policy implementation in China focus on this central-
local interface. Studies have found that implementation of central policies is
highly selective and that local ofﬁcials are self-serving, mainly motivated either
by ﬁnancial gains for themselves or their allies in the “shadow state” or by career
advancement opportunities.1 When they have no incentive to implement a pol-
*We gratefully acknowledge the substantive and editorial suggestions of the editors, Anita Chan and
Jonathan Unger, and the valuable comments of two reviewers. Research for this article received support
from a Singapore Ministry of Education Academic Research Fund Tier 2 grant (grant number MOE2012-
T2-2-115).
1. Graeme Smith, “Political Machinations in a Rural County,” China Journal, no. 62 (July 2009): 29–59;
Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, “Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China,” Comparative Politics 31,
no. 2 (1999): 167–86.
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icy correctly, local ofﬁcials may resort to cheating and collusion to feign compli-
ance.2
Other scholars have countered that in the past decade or so the central gov-
ernment has gained preponderant control over ﬁscal resources and can use ﬁscal
transfers through project funds to effectively motivate local ofﬁcials to adopt cen-
tral policies. Besides this carrot, the central government can also use the cadre
evaluation system effectively as a stick to reward and punish local ofﬁcials.3
But the right incentives alone are not enough. Capacity matters just as much,
and local governments in rural China today are low on capacity, after tax reforms
deprivedmany of themof sufﬁcient revenues and employees. Studies of rural town-
ship governments have consistently found that these grassroots governments have
become hollowed out “administrative shells,” deprived of ﬁscal resources and un-
derstaffed.4 County governments are in better shape than townships, which gives
them leverage to motivate and discipline township governments. But most of the
tasks of policy implementation ultimately get passed down to township govern-
ments, where implementing central policies—especially those lacking societal sup-
port or even facing opposition—often poses a daunting challenge.
Rural governments in China have implemented unpopular policies before, most
notably birth control and tax and fee collection.5 In these cases, coercion that em-
ployed physical force played an important role. But the local governments also paid
a high price for their use of coercion in terms of social stability and state-society
relations. In the case of rural taxes, it was precisely these social and political costs
that eventually caused the central government to change course and revamp na-
tional policies. Furthermore, since the mid-2000s local states have had less capac-
ity to use coercion due to the national government’s political discourse on “Har-
monious Society,” a corresponding rise in the importance of maintaining social
stability (weiwen维稳) when evaluating rural ofﬁcials’ performance, and rural res-
idents’ familiarity with and skills in using petitions and protests to counter local
governments’ moves.6
2. Xueguang Zhou, “The Institutional Logic of Collusion among Local Governments in China,” Modern
China 36, no. 1 (2010): 47–78.
3. Gunter Schubert and Anna L. Ahlers, “County and Township Cadres as a Strategic Group: ‘Building a
New Socialist Countryside’ in Three Provinces,” China Journal, no. 67 (January 2012): 67–86; Anna L.
Ahlers and Gunter Schubert, “Effective Policy Implementation in China’s Local State,” Modern China 41,
no. 4 (2015): 372–405.
4. John James Kennedy, “From the Tax-for-Fee Reform to the Abolition of Agricultural Taxes: The Im-
pact on Township Governments in North-West China,” China Quarterly, no. 189 (March 2007): 43–59;
Jean C. Oi, Kim Singer Babiarz, Linxiu Zhang, Renfu Luo, and Scott Rozelle, “Shifting Fiscal Control to
Limit Cadre Power in China’s Townships and Villages,” China Quarterly, no. 211 (September 2012):
649–75; Graeme Smith, “The Hollow State: Rural Governance in China,” China Quarterly, no. 203 (Septem-
ber 2010): 601–18.
5. O’Brien and Li, “Selective Policy Implementation.”
6. The literature does contain cases of effective policy implementation by local governments in this new
context of weakened ﬁscal and administrative capacities and greater emphasis on social stability—for exam-
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This article examines how local governments in a county in Hunan responded
to the predicament they faced when pressured and rewarded from above to im-
plement an unpopular grain production policy of promoting two rice crops a
year. With the stock of farmland dwindling, the national government has prior-
itized double cropping in rice farming to meet its policy goal of increasing grain
output. However, double cropping, as we will discuss, is against the economic in-
terests of most smallholding farming households and is resisted by them. This
county’s revenues heavily depend on the central government’s earmarked ﬁscal
transfers for supporting grain production, which placed county ofﬁcials in a pre-
dicament. While they can still use deceptive tricks to exaggerate local grain pro-
duction data to fool the central government, on-site inspections by the Ministry
of Agriculture mean that the local governments nonetheless have to deliver “tan-
gible results.”7
How did the local governments implement this policy without the small
farmers’ cooperation? Economic decision making on what crops to grow now lies
with households, and local states do not have the power to force millions of ru-
ral households to go against their self-interest on this purely economic matter.
Campaign-style mass mobilization, which is still a favorite implementation tool
for local ofﬁcials,8 can do little either. Subsidies—another tool that local govern-
ments now increasingly rely onwhen interactingwithmarket-oriented rural house-
holds—also failed to elicit a positive response. Small farmers in this county found
the subsidies not substantive enough to comply. The local governments had to
come up with a new solution.
The information used in this study derives from ﬁeldwork in Pingwan County
inHunan Province.9 Pingwan is a typical agricultural county, located in theDong-
ting Lake Plain that stretches from north to central Hunan Province—one of the
nine major commodity grain bases (商品粮基地) in the country. The total farm-
land in the county amounts to about one million mu, of which rice paddies ac-
count for 90 percent of the acreage. The county’s total population is 1.22 million,
of which nearly one million people hold rural household registration. In three
ple, Schubert and Ahlers’s studies of the implementation of the Building a New Socialist Countryside poli-
cies (“County and Township Cadres as a Strategic Group”). These studies, however, did not select unpopu-
lar policies that encountered strong resistance. There was generally societal support for projects like village
beautiﬁcation, infrastructure building, social welfare extension, or even agricultural modernization, as shown
in the win-win outcomes they describe. In implementing these policies, acquiescence, rather than active co-
operation was all that was needed by local governments. The local population only needed to stay out of the
way when local states used their own resources to deliver tangible results. The local states’ capacity to over-
come societal opposition to policy implementation was therefore not put to the test.
7. Ahlers and Schubert, “Effective Policy Implementation.”
8. Graeme Smith, “Measurements, Promotions and Patterns of Behavior in Chinese Local Government,”
Journal of Peasant Studies 40, no. 6 (2013): 1027–50.
9. All names of places in Hunan and personal names in this article are pseudonyms.
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ﬁeld trips to Pingwan county from 2011 to 2013, totaling 12 months, the ﬁrst
author visited half of the 26 rural townships in the county and conducted over
400 interviews with local cadres, farmers, and large-scale agricultural produc-
ers.10 Both authors revisited Pingwan in July 2014 for follow-up interviews with
local ofﬁcials and residents.
GRAIN PRODUCTION IN CHINA: POLICY
CHALLENGES AND CHOICES
China’s demand for grain continues to rise. As long as the central government
maintains the policy of national grain self-sufﬁciency, it has to ﬁnd ways to in-
crease domestic grain production to meet the growing demand.11 For that pur-
pose, the central government established a Mid- to Long-Term Plan for National
Grain Security (国家粮食安全中长期规划纲要) in 2008. After the State Council
approved the plan in July 2008, the National Development and Research Com-
mission and the Ministry of Agriculture jointly issued a more speciﬁc policy plan
to increase grain production by 50 million metric tons by 2020—a nearly 10 per-
cent increase from the 2009 level of 500 million tons.12 Facing accelerating ur-
banization, a subsequent decrease in farmland, and a continued shift by farmers
from grain production to more proﬁtable nongrain foods, raising grain yields per
acre has become the only feasible way to increase grain output. The national plan
therefore calls for two speciﬁc policy interventions: in rice-growing regions, to
expand double cropping; and in the North China plain, to increase maize plant-
ing density.
This policy goal, however, faces a series of challenges. First, marketization re-
forms in the agricultural sector since the 1990s have taken all decision-making
power regarding grain production out of the state’s control. The administrative
and planning tools that the state once wielded under the planned economy—for
example, setting and allocating production and procurement quotas for collec-
10. The three trips were made in December 2011 to January 2012, December 2012, and January to
September 2013.
11. The central government ﬁrst speciﬁed the goal of maintaining a grain self-sufﬁciency rate not lower
than 95 percent in the 1996 Grain White Paper. This goal was reiterated in the “Mid- to Long-Term Plan
for National Grain Security, 2008–2020.” In late 2013, the central government articulated for the ﬁrst time
a “national grain security strategy” and identiﬁed the target as “basic self-sufﬁciency in cereals and absolute
safety in staple grains” (谷物基本自给, 口粮绝对安全). In the Ministry of Agriculture’s twelfth ﬁve-year plan
for 2011–15, this goal is further speciﬁed as “100 percent self-sufﬁciency in rice, wheat, and maize.” In short,
a grain self-sufﬁciency rate of at least 95 percent has been a consistent central policy goal for the past two
decades and will remain so in near future. Whether this goal is realistic or has merit is not a question we
can address here.
12. National Development and Reform Commission, “The Plan for Increasing 100 Billion Jin [50 billion
kilos] of Grain Production Capacity (2009–2020),” http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-11/03/content_1455493.htm.
In these statistics, grains include rice, wheat, maize, and other types of cereals, as well as beans and tubers.
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tive producers under a national procurement system13—have all been disman-
tled. Grain production today is determined by the market-oriented calculations
of individual farmers.
Second, the rural tax reforms, which started in 2000 and culminated with the
abolition of the national agricultural tax in 2006, had an unintended conse-
quence: by eliminating agriculture as a source of ﬁscal revenues for local govern-
ments, these reforms deprived local governments of incentives to support agri-
cultural production.14 On the contrary, under the current cadre performance
evaluation system, which emphasizes GDP growth, courting businesses to attract
investment, and urbanization,15 local governments actually have incentives to turn
farmland into industrial and urban uses.
Third, market conditions are not conducive to families putting extra effort into
grain production. Since the mid-2000s, wages for nonfarm jobs have continued
to rise, and rural laborers prefer nonfarm wage work over farming. In Pingwan,
for example, rice farming on an average of one mu per resident can earn around
500 yuan for about a week’s worth of intensive labor spread across ﬁve months.
But when one can earn over 150 yuan for just one day’s work at a local construction
site, there is little economic incentive to continue with rice farming. Even those who
stay with farming prefer to turn to economically more rewarding “new agricul-
ture,”16 such as vegetables, fruits, poultry, and livestock, than to cultivate grain.
Grain production has increasingly become an activity for the elderly and faces a
labor shortage.
Neither the political incentives for local governments nor the economic ra-
tionale of rural residents are aligned with the central government’s goal. As a re-
sponse, since 2005 the central government has adopted a series of measures to
incentivize county governments in grain-producing regions. The goal is to make
grain-producing localities both “politically valued and ﬁscally rewarded” (政治上
有地位,财政上有奖补). The emphasis is on major grain-producing regions (粮食
主产区) and big grain-producing counties (产粮大县), which include 13 provinces
in the former category and over 800 counties in the latter. Grain output from these
13. Jean C. Oi, “Peasant Grain Marketing and State Procurement: China’s Grain Contracting System,”
China Quarterly, no. 106 (June 1986): 272–90.
14. See, e.g., Kennedy, “From the Tax-for-Fee Reform”; and Oi et al., “Shifting Fiscal Control,” on how
local governments prior to the tax reforms relied on agricultural taxes and fees as the main revenue source
to fund both their routine operation and the provision of local public services.
15. Thomas Heberer, and René Trappel, “Evaluation Processes, Local Cadres’ Behaviour and Local Devel-
opment Processes,” Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 84 (2013): 1048–66; An Chen, “How Has the
Abolition of Agricultural Taxes Transformed Village Governance in China? Evidence from Agricultural
Regions,” China Quarterly, no. 219 (September 2014): 715–35; Smith, “Measurements, Promotions and Pat-
terns of Behavior.”
16. Philip C. C. Huang and Yuan Gao, “The Dynamics of Capitalization in Chinese Agriculture: Private
Firms, the State, or Peasant Households?” Rural China 10, no. 1 (2013): 36–65.
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800-plus counties now accounts for over 60 percent of the national total, and
their sales over 80 percent of the total domestically marketed supply.17
In such counties, grain production is now included in the cadre performance
evaluation system and counted as a career achievement. In 2008, the State Coun-
cil also created a new designation of “leading grain-producing counties” (粮食生
产先进县)18 to be granted to a subset of big grain-producing counties (around
100), which are further rewarded both politically and ﬁscally. Obtaining the
Leading County status is now counted as a key accomplishment when evaluating
local leaders for promotion. In Pingwan, for example, after the county obtained the
Leading County designation in 2011, the county head and the Agricultural Bu-
reau chief received the honor of attending the national award ceremony, where
they were greeted by national leaders including Premier Wen Jiabao. Soon after,
the county head was promoted to be the Party secretary in an urban district mainly
on account of his achieving the Leading County status.
Since 2005, ﬁscal rewards have been allocated by the central government to
each Big Grain-Producing County—and later to Leading Counties in even higher
amounts.19 These rewards have been steadily raised. By 2013, the central gov-
ernment had transferred 158.9 billion yuan to local governments through this
scheme.20
Between 2006 and 2010, as a Big Grain-Producing County, Pingwan had
already received a total of 127 million yuan in ﬁscal transfers from the center.
In 2011, upon gaining the Leading County designation, it was rewarded with a
10 million yuan bonus in addition to a ﬁscal transfer of 60 million, which had in-
creased from 10 million under the previous Big County status. In addition, the
Leading County designation gives the county a big advantage to compete for cen-
trally funded agriculture-related projects. The deputy county head in charge of ag-
riculture estimated to us that at least 50 percent of the county’s total ﬁscal revenue
of around 300 million yuan in 2011 were central funds directly or indirectly linked
to the county’s Leading County status. The county Party secretary stated in ofﬁcial
meetings that “promoting grain production has become the central engine that
drives our county’s ﬁscal growth.” For economically underdeveloped counties like
Pingwan with limited industrial and commercial tax revenues, these economic
awards are a godsend.
The competition for the Leading County status has, therefore, become intense.
Of the 800 plus Big Counties, only 100 counties receive the title of Leading County
17. Agricultural Statistical Yearbook, 2014.
18. They are also called “national super grain producers” (全国超级产粮大县).
19. Ministry of Finance, “MOF’s Circular on the Central Government’s Methods of Rewarding BGPCs”
(2005), http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengwengao/caizhengbuwengao2005/caizhengbuwengao
20056/200805/t20080525_42774.html.
20. Ministry of Finance, “The Central Fiscal System Allocates 31.9 Billion Yuan to Reward BGPCs”
(2013), http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/caizhengxinwen/201308/t20130829_983490.html.
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and the corresponding extra ﬁscal rewards. The selection of Big and Leading
Grain-Producing Counties has traditionally been based on three criteria: the area
sown in grain,21 total output, and marketed grain output. The Big Counties have
to undergo inspections every three years and face disqualiﬁcation if they fail to
keep up their performance, while Leading Counties face frequent on-site inspec-
tions by a team of high-level ofﬁcials jointly formed by theMinistry of Agriculture
and the provincial government.22
Data on sown area and grain output are self-reported by counties. Because
grain cultivators can sell their grain directly on the market to private parties, the
national government has no reliable way of gathering data on grain output from
local regions.23 While there are ways for the central government to fact-check
(see below), ﬁgures are open to manipulation and exaggeration. However, it is
not easy to cheat on-site inspection teams. In Hunan’s case, the provincial gov-
ernment requires counties to nominate inspection sites. Twice a year, after each
round of rice-seedling planting, the joint team visits these sites and tours the
county to inspect the overall situation. What the inspection team wants to see is
double cropping. So for counties like Pingwan, it becomes imperative to produce
enough sites and areas where double cropping is practiced in order to pass the in-
spection, keep their prized ﬁscal rewards, and advance ofﬁcials’ careers.
The county government cannot do double cropping on its own. Herein lies the
difference between the implementation of this policy and that of projects carried
out under the New Socialist Countryside umbrella such as building roads, schools,
and health clinics. Those projects do not depend on the participation and coop-
eration of rural residents; they can just be onlookers, while local governments hire
businesses to do the construction work. For double-crop rice farming, however,
the active willingness of grain farmers to participate is essential. But the problem
is that most smallholding farm households do not see it in their interest to adopt
double cropping. Then how do rural governments ensure double cropping gets
implemented?
SMALL FARMERS ’ REJECTION OF DOUBLE CROPPING:
THE LOGIC OF THE MARKET
Since the 1990s, the adoption of high-yield hybrid rice, which has been particu-
larly widespread in Hunan, has reduced the gap in annual yield between single
21. These include rice, wheat, and maize. In early 2015, the Ministry of Agriculture also announced a
national strategy of developing potato as a staple grain.
22. The team typically comprises bureau-chief level (司局级) ofﬁcials from the ministry and a deputy
governor and agricultural bureau chief from the province.
23. See Zhun Xu, Wei Zhang, and Minqi Li, “China’s Grain Production: A Decade of Consecutive
Growth or Stagnation?,” Monthly Review 66, no. 1 (2014): 25–37, on the problems in China’s grain statistics
and the difﬁculties in collecting grain output data.
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cropping and double cropping.24 Nowadays in Pingwan, a typical yield from sin-
gle cropping is around 650 kilograms per mu, whereas the combined yield from
the two harvests of double cropping is around 950 kilograms.25 But for small farm-
ers, this means that an additional crop’s inputs—labor time stretched over four
additional months and doubling the amount spent on seeds, fertilizers, pesticides,
and machine use—amounts to an increase of only some 300 kilograms of rice per
mu. After production costs are deducted, such an increment actually results in a
reduction of income compared with single cropping.
Table 1 shows the average production costs and incomes of small farmers en-
gaging in single and double cropping, based on data collected in a questionnaire
survey we conducted with 22 farming households of various scales in three ham-
lets. Among these households, ﬁve large-scale producers and four smallholders
adopted double cropping; three other large-scale producers and 10 smallholders
practiced single cropping. In terms of inputs, double cropping costs nearly twice
as much as single cropping (2,120 yuan vs. 1,245 yuan), yet the increment in out-
put is far less, which results in a net loss of farm proﬁt of 122 yuan. Even when
the additional government subsidies for double cropping are added in, single crop-
ping is still more proﬁtable than double cropping (by 63 yuan/mu), without count-
ing the opportunity cost of lost off-farm wage income.
Double-crop rice farming had been widespread in Pingwan before 2000—as
high as 60 to 70 percent of the rice acreage in well-irrigated plains areas and around
50 percent in hilly areas, where irrigation is more challenging.26 But in the last
15 years, as the high-yield hybrid seed became widely used and opportunities
for wage income increased, a quick reversal from double cropping back to single
cropping has occurred among smallholding farmers. By 2006, by the county gov-
ernment’s count, double cropping was practiced on less than ﬁve percent of the
county’s farmland.
The small farmers’ rejection of double cropping was based on their rational cal-
culation of costs of farm inputs, incomes fromwage work, and grain prices, which
are all beyond the local governments’ control.27 Subsidies remain the only way to
24. On the rising yield and adoption of hybrid rice, see Long Ping Yuan, “Hybrid Rice Breeding in
China,” in Advances in Hybrid Rice Technology, ed. S. S. Virmani, E. A. Siddiq and K. Muralidharan (Philip-
pines: International Rice Research Institute, 1998), 27–33. Agricultural extension ofﬁcers in Pingwan told us
that most rice farmers in the county buy commercial high-yield hybrid rice seeds and few use saved seeds
from their own harvests. Our ﬁeldwork conﬁrms this.
25. Because of the limitation imposed by soil fertility and weather conditions, the yield from double
cropping falls far below doubling the yield of single cropping.
26. These estimates are based on the water usage fees that used to be collected from farmers and should
be reliable.
27. The four smallholders in our sample who did double cropping all have two things in common. First,
their decision was motivated by their preference for the taste of late-harvest rice, not by economic reasons. Sec-
ond, all their scales are minuscule ( just around one mu) and their production was purely for self-consumption.
Thus, their presence does not contradict our argument here about the economic rationale against double cropping.
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attract small farmers to consider double cropping. But even these have failed to
give rural governments an effective lever to inﬂuence farmers’ choices. For most
small farmers, whose scale of rice acreage ranges from 0.5 to 10 mu, the 59 yuan/mu
subsidy for double cropping is too insigniﬁcant to tilt the balance—even 590 yuan
is less than a week’s wage at a local construction site. Unless the income from
grain is raised substantially, double cropping will remain an unpopular policy
and resisted by small farmers.
More than one informant relayed to us an extreme case that became widely
known. In one township, to fulﬁll the quota of double cropping allocated to them
by the county, township cadres took things into their own hands and rented ma-
chines to plow ﬁelds and bought and transplanted ﬁrst-season rice seedlings for
a few households, hoping that this would induce these families to accept double
cropping. But once the season came for planting single-crop seedlings and once
township cadres were no longer around, all these farmers plowed over their ﬁelds
and planted the high-yield single-crop seedlings.
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SOLUTION: FINDING NEW AGENTS
Besieged bymarket forces, opposed bymost small farmers, and lacking policy tools
to inﬂuence small farmers’ economic decisions, local governments in Pingwan had
to ﬁnd some newmeans—in fact, a new type of grain producer—to implement the
policy of double cropping. Fortunately for the local ofﬁcials, in the past two decades
capitalized, larger-scale agricultural producers known in Chinese as “new agricul-
tural business entities” (新型农业经营主体) have emerged.28 Governments at both
the central and local levels have played an active role in supporting the growth of
these new “modern” producers, including through direct subsidies. Two types of
new larger-scale producers are particularly relevant here: agribusiness companies
and so-called family farms ( jiating nongchang家庭农场). The latter are large farms
managed by families29 that have expanded signiﬁcantly through leasing land. The
requiredminimum scale varies across the country. In Pingwan, to register ofﬁcially
as a family farm for double-crop rice farming and to qualify to special targeted sub-
sidies requires a minimum size of 50 mu (100 mu of sown area in two seasons).
The large-scale family farms and agribusinesses have a different economic cal-
culus than smallholding household farmers. Table 2 shows the average costs and
incomes for single and double cropping calculated using data from eight large-
scale producers (ﬁve doing double-cropping, three doing single-cropping).
28. See Qian Forrest Zhang and John A. Donaldson, “The Rise of Agrarian Capitalism with Chinese
Characteristics: Agricultural Modernization, Agribusiness and Collective Land Rights,” China Journal 60
( July 2008): 25–47, on the new types of agricultural producers and institutional changes that gave rise to them.
29. See Henry Bernstein, Class Dynamics of Agrarian Change (Sterling, VA: Kumarian, 2010), on the dif-
ferentiation between family-owned, family-managed, and family-worked farms.
10 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 77
This content downloaded from 202.161.057.224 on September 13, 2018 01:27:59 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
T
ab
le
2.
P
ro
du
ct
io
n
C
os
ts
an
d
In
co
m
e
(y
ua
n
pe
r
m
u)
in
R
ic
e
Fa
rm
in
g
fo
r
La
rg
e-
Sc
al
e
P
ro
du
ce
rs
20
13
In
pu
t
(y
ua
n
pe
r
m
u)
O
ut
pu
t
P
ro
ﬁ
t
(y
ua
n
pe
r
m
u)
Fa
rm
in
g
m
et
ho
d
Fe
rt
ili
ze
r,
Se
ed
s,
an
d
P
es
tic
id
es
M
ac
hi
ne
U
se
W
at
er
U
se
La
bo
r
R
en
t
O
th
er
T
ot
al
Y
ie
ld
(k
g)
In
co
m
e
(y
ua
n
pe
r
m
u)
Fa
rm
P
ro
ﬁ
t
St
at
e
Su
bs
id
ie
s1
Sp
ec
ia
l
Su
bs
id
y2
N
et
Pr
oﬁ
t
Si
ng
le
cr
op
pi
ng
22
5
16
0
30
60
0
30
0
50
1,
36
5
60
0
1,
56
0
19
5
0
0
19
5
D
ou
bl
e
cr
op
pi
ng
33
3
32
0
30
1,
03
0
30
0
10
0
2,
11
3
90
0
2,
27
7
16
4
59
30
0
52
3
1.
T
he
ce
nt
ra
lg
ov
er
nm
en
ts
ub
si
di
es
(1
24
yu
an
/m
u,
as
sh
ow
n
in
ta
bl
e
1)
ar
e
ke
pt
by
th
e
ru
ra
lh
ou
se
ho
ld
s
w
ho
re
nt
ed
ou
tt
he
ir
la
nd
.T
he
la
rg
e
pr
od
uc
er
s
on
ly
re
ce
iv
e
th
e
co
un
ty
go
ve
rn
m
en
t’s
59
yu
an
/m
u
su
bs
id
y
fo
r
do
ub
le
cr
op
pi
ng
.
2.
T
hi
s
su
bs
id
y
is
al
lo
ca
te
d
by
th
e
co
un
ty
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
sp
ec
iﬁ
ca
lly
fo
r
la
rg
e-
sc
al
e
pr
od
uc
er
s
(a
bo
ve
50
m
u
ea
ch
se
as
on
).
B
es
id
es
a
ca
sh
pa
ym
en
t,
it
al
so
in
cl
ud
es
ag
ri
cu
lt
ur
al
in
-
su
ra
nc
e
an
d
su
bs
id
iz
ed
in
cu
ba
ti
ng
se
rv
ic
es
pr
ov
id
ed
by
th
e
co
un
ty
go
ve
rn
m
en
t’s
ag
ri
cu
ltu
ra
l
ex
te
ns
io
n
ag
en
cy
.
This content downloaded from 202.161.057.224 on September 13, 2018 01:27:59 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Comparing tables 1 and 2 reveals two important points. First, in both single- and
double-cropping the smallholders are able to obtain higher per unit yields (i.e.,
greater land productivity) than the large-scale grain producers. However, most
small farmers practice single cropping (i.e., idling their land for half of the year);
compared to them, the large-scale producerswhododouble cropping obtainhigher
total grain output (and land productivity) on a yearly basis. Second, while small-
holders suffer a net loss of proﬁt (63 yuan/mu) by shifting from single cropping to
double cropping, for large-scale producers, the same shift creates a net gain of proﬁt
(328 yuan/mu, a 168 percent increase). Clearly, large producerswould prefer double
cropping. They face a different incentive structure because of three key factors.
First, the large-scale producers receive an additional scale-based subsidy for
double cropping that is made exclusively available to them by the county govern-
ment. This 300 yuan/mu subsidy is ﬁve times more than the normal double-
cropping subsidy (58.9 yuan/mu) available to both the small and large-scale farm-
ers. In low-proﬁt-margin rice farming, this subsidy increases the proﬁt margin
for large-scale double cropping by 62 percent. It effectively offsets their land rental
cost and makes their double-cropping more proﬁtable than smallholding farm-
ers’, despite the large-scale producers’ lower per unit yield in each crop.
Second, the scale of productionmakes a big difference. The smallholders’ small
scale means that their labor remains under-employed, which suppresses labor
productivity and makes rice farming less rewarding than nonfarm jobs that offer
higher wages. But the large scale of large producers allows their employees to be
fully employed and obtain a labor productivity comparable to that found in wage
jobs. Even if a smallholding household with 10 mu of rice paddies were allowed
to receive the 300 yuan/mu additional subsidy granted to large-scale producers,
the household would obtain a 767 yuan/mu proﬁt from double cropping—or
an increment of 237 yuan/mu proﬁt compared with single cropping; but the ad-
ditional income of 2,370 yuan could hardly justify forgoing the much higher wage
incomes they could otherwise earn over four months. But for a large producer
with just 100 mu of farmland, an annual net proﬁt of 52,300 yuan from double
cropping is a worthwhile return.
Finally, the large-scale producers typically have their own farm machinery—
often purchased with government subsidies.30 They also pay rent for their land.
Their sunk costs in land rental and machine purchase give them incentives to
maximize the marginal productivity of these capital investments, and that means
doing double cropping. Single cropping would leave their capital investments in
land and machines idle for half the year.
30. We do not have a reliable way of calculating the real costs of large producers’ machine use in each
form of cropping, as both the purchase price and the lifespan of farm machines can vary greatly, depending
on the type of subsidies one gets and intensity of use. In table 2, the costs for machine use are hypothetical
ﬁgures, assuming they were hiring machine use.
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Besides the shared interest in double cropping, local governments in Pingwan
embraced these large-scale producers for an additional reason. These local gov-
ernments are increasingly preoccupied with reports, inspections by superiors,
and performance evaluations.31 The farming operations of large-scale producers
are far more feasible to audit than smallholders. Speciﬁcally, the allocation of
double-cropping subsidies requires local governments to measure the size of a
double-cropping operation, monitor the production process, coordinate the pace
and methods of production, dispense funds to recipients, and match the produc-
tion schedule with that of upper-level inspections. For township governments
that are already ﬁscally starved, administratively understaffed, and operationally
disengaged with the local population,32 this situation is ungovernable: it is impos-
sible to mobilize sufﬁcient staff to effectively monitor thousands of smallholders.
Such a task would be even more overwhelming than enforcing birth control, be-
cause in any given year, each village has only about 50 women of childbearing age
to monitor, and each township a few hundreds. This pales in comparison to the
thousands of smallholders who would need to be monitored.
A small number of large-scale rice producers is much more easily governable.
In our study of the ten townships in Pingwan where double cropping is widely
adopted, 66 large-scale producers have leased in 12,098 mu of farmland from
3,135 households. Though initially a large number of township and village cadres
had to be involved in facilitating land transfers from these several thousands of
households, this was only a one-off activity. Since then the number of farms that
need monitoring has dropped from 3,135 to 66.
Our interviews with ofﬁcials in county and township governments found a
consensus among them that large-scale double-crop grain producers are the only
agents who can help the governments to meet the policy goal required for main-
taining the Leading County status. In contrast, household-based smallholding
farming was considered the major obstacle to the “further development of grain
production.” To replace them with large-scale producers became an urgent task.
CLEARING THE WAY FOR LARGE-SCALE PRODUCERS:
STATE-BROKERED LAND TRANSFERS
Starting in 2009 the county government in Pingwan adopted a two-pronged ap-
proach to support the growth of large-scale producers. First, the county govern-
ment set up areas designated for double-crop rice farming, which also serve as
31. On the greatly increased amount of reporting and inspection that local governments face, see, for ex-
ample, Smith, “The Hollow State.” On the increasingly more elaborate schemes of cadre performance evalu-
ation, see Heberer and Trappel, “Evaluation Processes, Local Cadres’ Behaviour”; and Chen, “The Abolition
of Agricultural Taxes.” On the emphasis on quantiﬁable measures in such evaluation and local cadres’ selec-
tive responses, see O’Brien and Li, “Selective Policy Implementation.”
32. Chen, “Abolition of Agricultural Taxes”; Kennedy, “From the Tax-for-Fee Reform”; Smith, “The
Hollow State.”
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demonstration sites for the upper-level government inspection team. Within these
large areas, the village and township governments consolidated farmland by per-
suading or pushing households to lease their land to village authorities or, less of-
ten, directly to large-scale producers. The county and local governments then im-
plemented centrally funded projects such as comprehensive land improvement
(土地综合整治). This involved eliminating the boundaries of small plots and level-
ing contiguous ﬁelds to create desirable conditions for large-scale farming. Sec-
ond, the county government used funds from ﬁscal transfers it received because
of its Big County status to create a 150 yuan/mu per harvest subsidy for large-scale
double cropping.
If handing out subsidies to a handful of large-scale producers in each town-
ship is an easy task for township governments, transferring land from thousands
of households to create the necessary conditions for these large producers re-
quires active intervention. Unlike what one would expect from the depiction of
hollowed-out and weakened grassroots rural governments, township and village
ofﬁcials in Pingwan were surprisingly effective in acquiring large stretches of land
from farmers.
The county government created incentives to motivate the township and vil-
lage cadres to broker land transfers. Among the 200 points in township ofﬁcials’
performance evaluations, on which their careers depended, 30 points were now
allocated for their success in implementing double cropping, a weight on par with
that of birth control. They also received ﬁnancial bonuses for satisfactory imple-
mentation. Although township and village ofﬁcials regularly complained about the
increased workload and often disagreed with the county’s approaches, they were
still animated by these incentives and acted strategically to fulﬁll the land broker-
age task that was required of them.
Since 90 percent of farmland in Pingwan was devoted to rice farming,33 a low
proﬁt-margin activity that farmers were willing to forgo in exchange for rent,
overall there was not any signiﬁcant resistance from rural households to the local-
state-brokered land transfers. Households would receive for each mu of leased-
out land 300 yuan of rent plus the central government subsidies for farmland
(124 yuan/mu); these added up to over 400 yuan and came close to the proﬁt they
could get from single cropping. Therefore householdswhohad already shifted labor
to wage work or faced a labor shortage were willing to lease out their land.34 Our es-
timate is that typically 80–90 percent of the households in a village belonged to this
category. For most villagers, leasing out their land-use rights was usually on three-
33. The only signiﬁcant cash crop in the county was tobacco. But tobacco growing was coordinated by
the provincial state-owned tobacco company through contract-farming arrangements with rural households,
and did not conﬂict with the designated areas for double cropping.
34. In fact, most of these households had already transferred their farmland to relatives or neighbors, of-
ten rent free. The rent they could now receive from the village or large-scale producers gave them all the
more incentives to lease out.
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to ﬁve-year terms and thus did not cause them toworry about losing their property,
quite unlike the anger experienced elsewhere in China in land requisitions or hous-
ing demolition.
Those who initially had been unwilling to lease out their ﬁelds were pressured
or even compelled to comply eventually—not through any physical coercion by
local ofﬁcials but through pressure or compulsion by practical circumstances.
In Pingwan, there are two types of households who wanted to continue with rice
farming. The ﬁrst are those who had expanded their farming operation through
leasing in others’ land (often through informal and rent-free arrangements) and
had achieved amodest level of scale and proﬁt—the petty-bourgeois “middle farm-
ers.”35 Their scale—usually around 20–30 mu—was still too small to make double
cropping proﬁtable. The local-state-brokered land transfers and the imperative of
growing double crops posed a direct threat to them.
Their initial opposition, however, was quickly thwarted in two ways. First, the
highly fragmented distribution of landholdings in rural China means that a house-
hold’s small plots of land are typically interspersed among those of other house-
holds, and irrigation of all these plots must be coordinated. Once the surrounding
plots were scheduled to be leased to large-scale producers doing double crop-
ping, to continue single cropping on one’s own plots became practically impossi-
ble, since the small stand-alone single-crop ﬁelds would not ﬁt into the irrigation
schedule of double cropping. The difference in production schedules also meant
that the farm machines that they hired at planting and harvest times would not
be able to access an isolated plot surrounded by double-crop ﬁelds. Too, the local
state-brokered land transfer scheme, by offering to pay to rent land from house-
holds, also spoiled the landmarket for these middle farmers. Households that had
transferred their land to them for free now were taking back their land and leas-
ing to village authorities for a rent. The rent quickly rose to around 300 yuan per
mu, which accelerated the transfer of land away from these middle farmers and
reduced their scale back to an unproﬁtable level.
Mr. Liu’s experience helps illustrate this process. Before 2013, he had been one
of only three farmers who remained in rice farming among the 25 households
in Stone Bridge, a hamlet; the other families had all turned to off-farm wage la-
bor. Mr. Liu had expanded his single-cropping operation to over 20 mu of land
through informal, rent-free land transfers. When Stone Bridge was selected for
implementing double cropping, he refused to comply. The Party secretary pres-
sured him, and said, “while you have the land contract rights, you also have the
obligation to comply with both national and local policies; and if you don’t want
to do double cropping, then give the land to me, and I’ll ﬁnd someone to do it.”
This pressure and the 280 yuan per mu rent that the secretary was ready to pay
35. Qian Forrest Zhang, “Class Differentiation in Rural China: Dynamics of Accumulation, Commodiﬁ-
cation and State Intervention.” Journal of Agrarian Change 15, no. 3 (2015): 338–65.
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the other households who had lent him their land compelledMr. Liu to change his
mind. He gave up farming and, although already in his ﬁfties, went to Shenzhen
to work for his son. Some other middle farmers, pushed out of independent fam-
ily farming, became (as will be discussed) contract households working for An-
nong, an agribusiness company.
The second type of households who resisted the policy—an even smaller
group—were those stuck in poverty and who relied on their land for subsistence.
Almost without exception, these were also recipients of, or applicants for, gov-
ernment relief such as the minimum living allowance (dibao 低保). As these
households depended on the good will of the village leaders, they were vulnera-
ble to threats of denial of welfare beneﬁts. After a visit by an ofﬁcial who they
dared not offend, they either accepted a rent offer for their smallholding or agreed
to a land swap so that they could continue their single-crop farming outside the
designated areas for double cropping.
In this massive transfer of hundreds of thousands of mu of farmland from tens
of thousands of households, we have not heard of a single case that escalated into
a violent confrontation with village leaders. Yet the widespread compliance to land
transfers was not accomplished entirely voluntarily either. “Compulsion without
coercion” best describes this process.36 Governments in Pingwan did not use coer-
cion—by which we mean the use of physical force—as Chinese rural governments
still do in cases of forced eviction and demolition, mainly because they did not need
to. Instead, theywere able to effectivelymanipulate economic circumstances or very
modest welfare beneﬁts to deny dissenters any viable alternatives. This is compul-
sion in the sense that Karl Marx referred to as the “dull compulsion of economic
relations”37 when describing the subjugation of laborers to capitalists—a compli-
ance that does not require coercion and yet is not voluntary either, but based on
the denial of alternatives.
The compulsion sometimes bred resentment. In some cases, disgruntled villag-
ers, whose unwilling transfer of land compelled by village leaders had disrupted
their livelihoods, engaged in a “weapons-of-the-weak” type of resistance—sending
their chickens to forage in selected rice paddies or demanding to be hired by the
large-scale producer that took over their land but then shirking their work duties.
RECRUITING LARGE-SCALE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS
Large-Scale Family Farms
The creation of large family farms can be illustrated by the experience of Mr. Mi.
He had accumulated a small fortune from running a shoemaking business out-
36. We are indebted to an anonymous referee for phrasing it this way.
37. Karl Marx, Capital, Volume I (New York: Penguin Classics, 1992).
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side the county. In 2008, facing gloomy prospects in his business and noticing
the policy changes favoring scaled-up agriculture, he decided to take the one mil-
lion yuan in capital he had accumulated and return home to invest in agricul-
ture. At that time his family only had 5 mu of farmland. In 2009, he ﬁrst invested
in farm machines to provide services for hire. As his township was located within
a designated area for double cropping, the county’s Agricultural Bureau ap-
proached him about double-cropping rice farming, and he seized the opportunity.
That year, the bureau transferred to him over 1,000 mu of consolidated farmland
it had leased from households.
The governments’ support to Mr. Mi did not stop after the land transfer. In
2010, his ﬁrst year of operating 1,000 mu of double cropping resulted in a loss
of 400,000 yuan due to lack of experience and bad weather, a loss too big to be
offset by subsidies. The county government, not ready to lose this large amount
of double-crop land, went out of its way to assist him. He was awarded two ma-
jor honorary titles: as a National Labor Model (全国劳动模范), a political honor
that came with a state-paid pension after retirement; and as a National Leading
Grain Producer (全国种粮大户), a title given by the Ministry of Agriculture with
a 50,000 yuan cash bonus. The county’s Party secretary also promised tomake him-
self personally available to Mr. Mi whenever he needed him. The county soon al-
located him a piece of land in the county seat for him to build a warehouse and
set up a farm machine cooperative. With this type of backing, Mr. Mi’s landhold-
ings continued to grow, and by 2013 his family farm had become the largest in
Pingwan County, operating 2,500 mu of rice paddies. Based on three interviews
with him, our estimate is that his annual proﬁt is now over half a million yuan.
The favoritism shown to Mr. Mi was typical of large-scale family farms that
agreed to engage in double cropping. Mr. Gu, who, like Mr. Mi had run a busi-
ness before, was asked by a township to take over 100 mu of farmland to do dou-
ble cropping. This piece of land, however, was not suitable, as it was difﬁcult to
irrigate and had inadequate sunlight. But its location was politically strategic be-
cause it was alongside a main transportation route from the county seat, where
the inspection team would surely pass through. Not surprisingly, Mr. Gu suffered
a loss. In compensation, the township government gave him the contract for a
construction project at the township’s middle school.
Besides approaching local businesspeople to become family farmers, lower-
level ofﬁcials—for example, ofﬁcials at the village level, those who work in agri-
cultural extension ofﬁces, and a deputy head of a town—have also turned them-
selves into family farmers. The subsidies and spoils that are offered to themmake
large-scale double cropping worth pursuing. But most of these ofﬁcials and their
relatives have other responsibilities and businesses to attend to; so instead of do-
ing double cropping on their own, they have subcontracted the actual farming to
others. The primary motivation for them to take up double cropping is political
gains. Both they and their superiors saw this as shouldering a burden for the gov-
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ernment. In their words, instead of growing rice, they were “growing their per-
formance and work style credit” (种政绩,种作风). Our estimate is that about half
of the large-scale producers in double cropping are either ofﬁcials or their rela-
tives, which gave local governments greater urgency to ensure they did not fail.
Selecting political subordinates or people like Mr. Mi andMr. Gu, who had ac-
cumulated wealth from entrepreneurship are natural choices for local govern-
ments. This is especially so since the large size of the operations means that for
a 1,000-mu family farm, the initial investment is in the order of millions of yuan.
This is a risk far beyond what smallholders dare take. On the other hand, the po-
tential rewards alsomean that local governments have an opportunity to share the
spoils with their protégés.
Agribusiness Firms
Companies in agribusiness were equally valued and supported by local govern-
ments in Pingwan. The most notable player here is Annong Inc. The company
had previously been a subsidiary of the county-government-owned Supply and
Sales Cooperative, selling farm inputs. In 2009, it was privatized and bought by
a former ofﬁcial of the Supply and Sales Cooperative. Similar to Mr. Mi’s case,
Annong took over land that had already been consolidated by township govern-
ments and village authorities. The company has leased farmland in six townships
and by 2013 had gained control over 30,000 mu of rice paddies.
The company then set up production bases on the leased land, adopting the
widely used “company + base + households”model.38 Within Pingwan, the com-
pany subcontracted its land to over 30 so-called contract households (代管户).
The scale of these contract households’ farming operations ranges from several
hundred to ﬁfteen hundred mu. They are obligated to buy a service package from
the company, which includes fertilizers, seeds and pesticides, and farm machine
use. The households took care of irrigation and crop management. Once the har-
vest was delivered to the company, the households get paid based on the market
price, after deducting the fee for the service package. The company derived its
proﬁts from selling farm inputs and farm machine services to the households
and selling processed rice in themarket. The company acts purely as a land broker
and service vendor, rather than an agricultural producer.
It is obvious these contract households would be better off cutting out the
middleman, Annong, and directly leasing land from village authorities, as the
large-scale family farms did. Two conditions, however, created the current situ-
ation. First, unlike Mr. Mi, these contract households did not have enough capital
to manage a thousand-mu farm and shoulder the corresponding market risks.
Becoming contract households and working with Annong thus allowed these
38. Zhang and Donaldson, “Rise of Agrarian Capitalism.”
18 • THE CHINA JOURNAL , No. 77
This content downloaded from 202.161.057.224 on September 13, 2018 01:27:59 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
households to reach a scale larger than what their own capital endowments would
have allowed and larger thanmost family farms—which in Pingwan can be as small
as 50 mu. To work with Annong as a contract household had therefore become
a coveted opportunity that the company reserved only for those they could trust.
Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of ﬁve contract households for whom we
have detailed information.
Annong started with a small core group of contract households, many of whom,
as table 3 suggests, were employees of the company or relatives of the owner. As it
expanded its scale, the company relied on these households and preferred to expand
their scale rather than take in new contract households. Even when the company
expanded into a new township, it preferred not to recruit new local contract house-
holds, as this might pose a threat to the company: new contract households within
a village could potentially band together and persuade the village to transfer land di-
rectly to them, cutting out Annong.
A second reason that the county government turned to an agribusiness ﬁrm
like Annong is that it needed a super-scale and capital-rich company to compete
for nationally and provincially funded agricultural projects and implement them
once awarded. These projects typically require not only large scales of operation,
but also matching funds from the recipients, which can reach tens of millions
of yuan. No family farms are large enough to offer that. The county government
therefore had to concentrate a massive amount of farmland in Annong to create
the required scale and ﬁnancial capacity.
This patron-client relationship between the county government and Annong
is mutually beneﬁcial. For Annong, the proﬁts it derives from the contract house-
holds are insigniﬁcant; implementing double cropping was more about provid-
ing a valuable political service to the county government. The real reward is in
becoming the county’s exclusive agent in applying, receiving and implementing
funded projects. Annong started in 2009 with a registered capital of three million
yuan. Within four years, by winning provincial and national projects with the
county’s support, the company has accumulated assets in the order of tens of
Table 3. A Sample of Contract Households Working for Annong, Inc.
Year Joining
the Company
Relationship with the
Company/Owner
Farm Size
(mu)
1 2011 A manager in the company 1,000
2 2011 A company employee 1,200
3 2012 A company employee 1,200
4 2013 The owner’s cousin 900
5 2013 The owner’s former chauffer 1,500
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million. In 2014, the county government and Annong jointly won a National Ag-
ricultural Technology Park project, funded by the Ministry of Science and Tech-
nology to the tune of 800 million yuan.
Nationwide Replacement of Small Farmers by Large Producers
The practice of mass consolidation of farmland into relatively few hands is not
unique to Pingwan. Most of the 800-plus counties in the Big Grain-Producing
County category aspire to rise into the ranks of Leading Counties and adopt a
similar practice. The only exceptions we know of are counties in Heilongjiang and
Xinjiang, where large-scale producers had emerged out of state farms and domi-
nated grain production from the start.39
This reliance on large-scale producers to achieve grain production goals is
prevalent in the major wheat and maize regions, not just conﬁned to rice produc-
tion. We conducted ﬁeldwork in 2012 in Henan Province’s Zhoukou Prefecture
on the North China Plain, where a new method of planting maize is pushed by
the local governments and follows the same logic as in Pingwan.
For the past four decades, farmers on the North China Plain have adopted a
double-cropping practice of planting winter wheat and summer maize. Maize
seeds were sown one month before the wheat harvest without ﬁrst plowing,
a practice known as “intercropping” (套种). This lowered the density of maize
plants but saved on labor costs and prolonged the growing period for maize.
Now, in order to raise maize output, a new planting method known as direct
planting (套种改直播) has become the main policy goal pursued by local govern-
ments. This new method introduces four changes: planting maize is now done
(1) after the wheat harvest, (2) in a highlymechanized way that plows wheat stalks
directly into the ground, (3) using new varieties of maize and wheat seeds that re-
quire a shorter growing period, and (4) sowing maize kernels in higher density.
Although this method signiﬁcantly increases yields, it has faced the same apathy
among small farmers as rice double cropping faces in Pingwan, because the mar-
ginal gain in output from increased density cannot economically justify the addi-
tional labor and materials inputs. We discovered that county governments in
Zhoukou prefecture have therefore adopted the same strategy of supporting the rise
of large-scale family farms and agribusiness by brokering land transfers and pro-
viding scale-based subsidies.
This strategy of recruiting large-scale producers also applies to counties that
cannot aspire to be in the Big Grain-Producing County category. While these
39. Qian Forrest Zhang, “Reforming China’s State-Owned Farms: State Farms in Agrarian Transition,”
in Asian Rural Sociology IV:The Multidimensionality of Economy, Energy and Environmental Crises and
Their Implications for Rural Likelihoods, ed. L. L. Tolentino et al. (Laguna: University of the Philippines Los
Banos College, 2010), 365–78.
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counties are not eligible for ﬁscal rewards tied to grain output, they are motivated
to comply with the national authorities’ policy in the hope of beneﬁting from the
large amount of ﬁscal transfers that are available through centrally funded agricul-
tural projects. National policies beginning with the Eleventh Five-Year Plan an-
nounced in 2005 and reafﬁrmed in each of the annual No. 1 Central Policy Docu-
ments from 2008 through 2015 all identify large-scale producers as the new agents
for modernizing Chinese agriculture.40
COLLUSION BETWEEN RURAL GOVERNMENTS
AND LARGE-SCALE PRODUCERS
Creating agents for policy implementation or political control has been reported
in studies of agrarian politics in Southeast Asia.41 In promoting the adoption of
Green Revolution technology, which served the policy goals of increasing grain
production and lowering urban food prices, governments in Indonesia, Thailand,
Malaysia, and the Philippines had channeled resources to various agents such as
the local political elite, landowners, ethnically indigenous rice farmers, and the
merchant class in rural towns and relied on them both to extract rural surplus and
to police the countryside.42
In these Southeast Asian cases, some societal actors had economic or political
interests that were aligned with the state’s policy goals. With the state’s support,
they were then able to advance both their own interests and state policies. But
there are two key differences between China and these other countries in the
state’s relationship with its agents. First, China’s local governments were more ac-
tive in recruiting and sometimes in creating large-scale agents. Second, the Chi-
nese rural governments did not rely on these agents to extract surpluses from be-
low and police the countryside, but rather to capture funds from above and to
satisfy upper-level governments. To recruit and create new agents, they rely on
land brokerage; to deal with their superiors, they collude with their agents.
The grassroots governments’ land brokerage in Pingwan was still constrained
by limited capacity, as the county government had limited ﬁscal and political re-
sources to subsidize large-scale producers. In the heated competition in rural China
for the Leading County status, all the ﬁnancial subsidies that a county government
40. Qian Forrest Zhang, Carlos Oya, and Jingzhong Ye, “Bringing Agriculture Back In: The Central Place
of Agrarian Change in Rural China Studies,” Journal of Agrarian Change 15, no. 3 (2015), 299–313; and
Jingzhong Ye, “Land Transfer and the Pursuit of Agricultural Modernization in China,” Journal of Agrarian
Change 15, no. 3 (2015): 314–37.
41. See contributions in Gillian Hart, Andrew Turton, and Benjamin White, eds., Agrarian Transforma-
tions: Local Processes and the State in Southeast Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
42. Gillian Hart, “Agrarian Change in the Context of State Patronage,” in Hart, Turton, and White,
Agrarian Transformations, 31–49; Jonathan Pincus, “Approaches to the Political Economy of Agrarian
Change in Java,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 20, no. 1 (1990): 3–40.
Betting on the Big • 21
This content downloaded from 202.161.057.224 on September 13, 2018 01:27:59 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
can afford may not generate enough large-scale producers to reach the required
acreage of double-cropping rice ﬁelds. Therefore, in addition to delivering tangible
results on the ground, local governments still need to deploy tricks of deceit and
manipulation to maximize their chances of winning in the competition.
Ofﬁcials in Pingwan conﬁded to us privately that the real adoption rate of dou-
ble cropping was at best 40 percent (about 300,000 mu of farmland), which was
also our impression from ﬁeld observations. But the county government ofﬁcially
reported in 2013 an adoption rate of 90 percent, which was approved by the in-
spection team.43 This exaggerated ﬁgure enabled the county to retain its Leading
County title. For such an exaggeration to pass inspection, the county and town-
ship governments in Pingwan needed their agents’ collusion in gaming the in-
spections and cheating their superiors.
The key practice—alluded to in Mr. Gu’s case—is to plant double-crop rice
paddies at strategic locations along major roads. The intent was to make them
highly visible to the inspection team, whose itinerary was carefully managed
by the county government and activities closely monitored. These sites—the “des-
ignated demonstration areas for double cropping”—were selected not because
of any physical properties conducive to double cropping, but rather for their vis-
ibility.
To measure grain output in the counties and also to help select Leading Coun-
ties, the Ministry of Agriculture sends technicians to measure the output of
20 sample sites in each county; the average yield from this sample is then extrap-
olated—based on the county’s reported total area, after approval by the inspection
team—to derive the total output of the county. This seemingly scientiﬁc method,
however, has a ﬂaw: the 20 sampled sites are not randomly selected, and the county
knows in advance where they are. Local governments therefore include these sites
in the designated demonstration areas and make sure the best support is provided
to produce high yields. As shown in Mr. Gu’s case, spending so much money on
these sites can be economically counterproductive. The large-scale producers need
to suspend their economic rationale and collude with local ofﬁcials in the expec-
tation that their service to the local government will be reciprocated.
In this practice, the implementation goal shifts from wide adoption of double
cropping to implementing double cropping at strategic locations, or, in local of-
ﬁcials’ parlance, implementing roadside projects (马路工程). This happens not
because of any intrinsic opposition that the local governments hold against the
national government’s policy goals or dysfunctionality in the political system.
It is instead mainly a result of the local governments’ limited capacity in imple-
43. Falsely reporting 40 percent as 90 percent seemed to be a blatant exaggeration that should be easy to
detect. But in practice, for the inspection team to go beyond the 300,000 mu of double cropping rice pad-
dies, all strategically located, to ﬁnd the falsely reported areas was similar to the proverbial search for a nee-
dle in a haystack.
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menting the policy. In this sense, the tactics of the local governments can be
thought of as a “coping strategy” and “adaptive mechanisms” to deal with their
predicaments.44
The relationship that has formed between local governments and the large-
scale producers in Pingwan bears a resemblance to the patron-client ties that have
been widely found in studies of local state-society relationships elsewhere in ru-
ral China.45 There are, however, also important differences. The clientelist rela-
tions described in the literature are more about “sharing the spoils” than meet-
ing policy challenges. Those local government patrons and clients usually have
prior relationships—based on family ties, for example—independent of the new
policies that the local governments need to meet; these ties are then mobilized to
capture the rent-seeking opportunities created by policies. In our case, however,
new clients need to be cultivated for the purpose of meeting a policy challenge.
In other cases, policy implementation serves patron-client ties; in Pingwan,
clientelist ties are built to serve policy implementation. In the cases of Mr. Mi
and Mr. Gu, for example, spoils were awarded to them because they had ﬁrst
helped the government with policy implementation. Of course, once formed, the
new patron-client relationship can evolve and focus increasingly on the sharing
of spoils.
CONCLUSION
Financial and political incentives were created by the central government to in-
crease the output of grain-producing localities. To achieve this, the government
focused on an expansion of double cropping of rice and of other grains. In
Pingwan county and elsewhere, this led county and local governments to transfer
large stretches of agricultural land out of the hands of smallholding households
and into the hands of large-scale producers such as family farms and agribusiness
ﬁrms. The authorities used subsidies and favors to align the economic interests
of the large producers with the local state’s policy goals. Local authorities have
also relied on the large producers to collude in exaggerating the county’s acreage
in double cropping so as to win upper-level approval.
In evaluating the implications of these ﬁndings on local governance in rural
China, we highlight two insights. First, even though governments at the township
and village levels have been administratively and ﬁscally weakened after the rural
44. Zhou, “The Institutional Logic of Collusion,” 69, 74.
45. Ben Hillman, “Factions and Spoils: Examining Political Behavior within the Local State in China,”
China Journal, no. 64 (July 2010): 1–18; Chunyu Wang, Jingzhong Ye, and Jennifer C. Franco, “Local State
Corporatism or Neo-Guanxilism? Observations from the County Level of Government in China.” Journal of
Contemporary China 23, no. 87 (2014): 498–515; Smith, “Political Machinations,” and “Measurements, Pro-
motions and Patterns of Behavior.”
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tax reforms, they are still capable of “strategic actions under reduced capacity.”46
Governments in Pingwan have raised the adoption rate of double rice cropping
from below 5 percent in 2006 to about 40 percent in 2013. This achievement is
even more remarkable when we take into consideration the highly challenging
circumstances local governments faced, especially the opposition from small-
holding farmers.
The local governments in Pingwan achieved this through two strategic ac-
tions, which together form what we call the strategy of “policy implementation
through preferred agents.” First, when faced with opposition from smallholding
household farmers, the county government substituted the original policy goal
with one that was far more acceptable to most small farmers—paid land transfers
into the hands of large-scale producers. In so doing, they also substituted small
farmers, who had previously dominated rice farming, with a new type of pro-
ducer responsive to their policy tools. Second, in brokering land transfers, grass-
roots governments strategically used the limited leverage they still have to com-
pel villagers to comply, without causing strong resistance.
Pingwan’s case shows that the image of township governments after the tax
reform as hollow shells is incomplete. After decollectivization and marketization
in the 1980s, the rural population in China became socially differentiated, eco-
nomically motivated by market-based self-interest, and thus less controllable when
a local government needs to pursue the state’s policy goals. The rural tax reforms
further weakened the local governments’ capacity to inﬂuence the farmers’ eco-
nomic behavior. As a result, governability has become increasingly a challenge in
spheres such as agricultural production and public service provision. The “hollow
shells” account, while accurately depicting the new challenges facing local rural
governments, however neglected to show, as we do here, how ﬁscally and admin-
istratively weakened local governments have responded by adopting a new gover-
nancemode: relying on nonstate elites as the preferred agents for policy implemen-
tation and political control. This is an additional important factor underpinning
the pro-large-scale policies widely found in rural China today.
Second, our case studies show the need for a dialectical approach in evaluat-
ing policy implementation that is sensitive to contradictions and contingencies.
Pingwan’s successful implementation of the double cropping policy comes at a
social and political cost. The policy has adversely reshaped the class dynamics in
agriculture—pushing out middle farmers from agriculture, intensifying the com-
modiﬁcation of subsistence for most rural households, and undermining the con-
ditions of reproduction for ordinary smallholding peasants. The promotion of dou-
ble cropping, though it brought moderate gains in total grain output, also created a
distorted allocation of the county’s ﬁscal resources, which could have a deleterious
46. See Schubert and Ahlers, “County and Township Cadres as a Strategic Group” for a similar argument.
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effect on overall grain production. The county devoted most of its agriculture-
related resources to support the large-scale producers through subsidies, extension
services, and irrigation facilities. The majority of the county’s rice paddies, how-
ever, have continued to be in the hands of smallholding family farms that have re-
ceived little support. The irrigation facilities available to them have, as a result, de-
teriorated rapidly, to the extent that more rice paddies have suffered declining
yields due to insufﬁcient irrigation or even have had to be converted to dry agricul-
ture. The disrepair of irrigation facilities has made small farmers increasingly vul-
nerable to drought, which has occurred with increased frequency in the past few
years. The conﬂuence of inadequate subsidies for single cropping, declining land
productivity, a declininggrainprice, and risingnonfarmwageshas gradually pushed
more families out of rice farming and resulted in increasing incidences of idle farm-
land in the county.
Thus, when we look at the overall balance of grain output, the extent to which
the 40 percent adoption rate of double cropping in Pingwan resulted in a signif-
icant rise in production is questionable.47 Large-scale producers did not pursue the
quality and intensity of crop care traditionally practiced by smallholding family
farmers, and their yield from the two harvests of double cropping is generally only
30–40 percent higher than from single cropping in small farms. Furthermore, given
that state subsidies constitute the bulk of large-scale producers’ proﬁt from double
cropping (69 percent, see table 2), it is doubtful whether they would stick around
if such subsidies were discontinued. However, we should also refrain from calling
the implementation of the double-cropping policy an “inefﬁcient” use of China’s
resources. Importing grain would be certainly cheaper, but the central govern-
ment’s policy goal of national grain self-sufﬁciency precludes that. Given this du-
rable decision, an alternative national policy would be to devote resources to im-
proving infrastructure and technical services for small and middle farmers and
to provide land brokerage so as to transfer land to ordinary families that wish to
remain in agriculture. This could boost the output from single-cropping farming
and encourage more families to remain in rice farming. This approach is socially
more equitable and ecologically more sustainable; but the added support to small
farmers can hardly reverse the powerful market logic that drives their rejection of
double cropping. As long as small farmers continue with single cropping and idle
their land during half of the year, the large-scale producers, by utilizing their land
year-round through double cropping, have in fact enhanced the total yield and land
productivity, which is the national government’s priority, despite having lower
yields and proﬁtability than small farmers in one crop.
Most importantly, the implementation of this alternative policy would require
rural governments to interact closely with a vast number of smallholding house-
47. Just like upper-level governments, we could not get reliable data on the county’s real grain output either.
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holds to gather information, dispense resources, provide services, and evaluate
production. Even if local authorities had the incentives, which is by nomeans cer-
tain, they do not have the capacity to implement this well. Thus, what potentially
is a more desirable policy alternative may have been precluded by the downsizing
of rural local governments.
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